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Abstract III
Abstract
An increasing number of publications about theoretical approaches and new findings illustrate
the relevance of the topic environmental risk assessment. The actual discussion about high oil
prices is not incorporated under this headline; but it should be, as natural resource scarcity is a
crucial economic factor. In practical experience, more and more banks, insurance companies
as well as investors realize that there are certain areas with a high correlation between
sustainable development and corporate success, corporate risk exposure and corporate
performance.
In this discussion one of the most obvious topics are risks related to climate change.
According to the findings of surveys evaluated in this paper climate change starts to affect
economic development and companies’ performance in various ways. Over the next decade,
economic losses due to climate change are estimated by US$ 150 billion per year. As result
world’s business leaders have described climate change as the biggest challenge of the 21st
century. Hence, the incorporation of climate change as a risk factor is essential, but risks
related to climate change feature a severe issue of complex structure and uncertainty;
traditional risk assessment tools appear in the light of not being able to either reflect the
multifaceted system nor provide sufficient outcomes.
Environmental risk assessments in general so far have mainly emphasized – if at all – on
actual and possible impacts of the release of materials or emissions (external effects). But an
overall sustainable risk assessment has also to take into account the risks related to the inflow
of materials. The main reason for neglecting the inflow risks from an environmental
perspective can be seen in the fact that these risks seem to be less tangible and more
uncertain. Nevertheless, in a world where economic development and the use of natural
resources is not uncoupled yet, a steadily increasing economic power will result in a
continually rising extraction of resources. As all resources are limited, the risk of scarcity will
rise; and the example of water illustrates that it already exists. Indeed, scarcity is not tangible
for all kind of resources from a present point of view. Hence, a specified analysis is needed
considering different market and supply conditions. A comprehensive analysis of environ-
mental risks needs to encompass risks affecting the output as well as the input side of a value
chain. This paper enlarges the discussion on environmental risk assessments upon the input
dimension using the example of carbon risks.
Firstly, carbon risks are defined as risks related to climate change at the corporate level with a
focus on the input as well as the output dimension. Secondly, an analysis of the current
discussion on the topic of carbon risk evaluates the status quo of scientific work in this field.
Thirdly, in terms of developing a practically oriented tool, the Value-at-Risk approach and it’s
application to measure input oriented carbon risks are scrutinized. The results discuss how
future volatility and market prices can be utilized to describe the uncertainty resulting from
markets acknowledging and pricing oil scarcity as a risk factor. Finally recommendations with
a focus on strategic management decisions and financial performance analysis are given and
further research opportunities are drawn.
The conclusion is; once markets have acknowledged the depletion mid-point as a measure of
oil scarcity, natural scarcity will result in a significant higher Value-at-Risk. The Value-at-
Risk of one barrel of crude oil could then be as high as US$ 15.5 in the short term and even
US$ 17.2 in the long term.
The scope of this paper is neither intended to predict one likely development nor to
demonstrate how this tool can actually work in terms of forecasting single companies’
performance. But in order to point the way ahead, this paper provides scenarios for potential
future developments and sets a frame for risk assessments due to oil scarcity.
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Introduction 1
1 Introduction
According to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) human activities have led to an exceptional intense increase in earth’s temperature in
the 20th century. The accumulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere is the main driver of climate change. But not only the increase of temperature
provides evidence for climate change, also the number of reports and statistical results about
natural catastrophes, aridity or floats indicate the apparent change.
Due to these facts climate change is one of the most discussed environmental issues in public.
Furthermore, climate change has also started to affect economic development and companies’
performance in various ways. And this was the trigger that prompted world’s business leaders
to declare climate change as the biggest challenge of the 21st century.1 This reaction is
reasonable, in light of the estimated economic losses due to climate change of US$ 150 billion
per year over the next decade.2 Hence, the incorporation of climate change as a factor of risk
is essential, but related risks have a complex structure; traditional risk assessments, defined as
“the calculation of probabilities of specific harm from particular activities, natural or
manmade,”3 do neither reflect the multifaceted system nor provide sufficient outcomes.
Environmental risk assessments so far in general have emphasized on the possible impacts of
the release of materials or emissions of a system. An overall risk assessment has also to take
into account the risks related to the inflow of materials as well. The understanding of
environmental risk assessment needs to be extended, as it was done in the context of corporate
environmental management systems. Until the early 90’s there was a clear focus on end-of-
pipe technologies; with the upcoming discussion of eco-efficiency the focus switched to more
comprehensive approaches such as integrated product policy or life cycle analysis.
In terms of assessing environmental input oriented risks, different systematic factors and
specific correlations have to be contemplated and evaluated. As all resources are naturally
limited, scarcity emerges as one crucial risk factor. Resource scarcity depends on several
aspects such as availability, natural stocks, technical development, supply policies etc. The
example of water illustrates that resource scarcity is already a serious issue: In many
developing countries the problem of water scarcity exists and is presently a tangible risk
factor. For other materials the topic resource scarcity is not included in both, the discussion of
sustainability and the risk assessment tools. But from an economic perspective the latter has to
be considered: Once scarcity is on the rise and traders anticipate it, markets are going to react
and price the risks.
As a first step this paper enlarges the discussion on the topic resource scarcity by considering
environmental related risks upon the input dimension. Therefore, carbon risks are defined in
this paper as risks derived from (1) indirect and direct impacts of climate change on human
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beings, nature and economy, and (2) the use and the limitations of carbon emitting input
factors. The assessment of carbon risks at the corporate level demands a preceding analysis of
the origins and influences of these risks. Therefore, one possible way of assessing carbon
risks on the macro-level is briefly presented in the following section. As this paper is focused
on carbon risk assessment at the micro level, the ensuing examination deals with derived
impacts on corporations.
1.1 Assessing environmental risks at a macro-level
A tool for assessing global environmental risks, such as climate change, has to consider all
causal functions, relations and connections of the object of investigation. This can be seen as a
causal chain with different elements determining and influencing the overall risk exposure.
The first element of this chain is the demand for a good or service. Goods and services
demanded are able to affect the choice of the technologies and practices used to meet this
demand. The choice in technology can lead to a change in the fluxes of materials, for example
recycled materials vs. raw materials. This element should not solely be considered in terms of
the output dimension (e.g. emissions), notably the choice of technology does also affect the
inward flow of materials, the input. By including this variable into the causal chain, it is no
longer an assessment of external effects along the causal chain. In this concept input related
factors (e.g. quality and availability of input materials) are scrutinized simultaneously. The
ensuing element comprises of the valued environmental component. The last two links in the
causal chain describe the exposure and consequences for human beings and property.
Figure 1.1 Causal chain for global environmental risk assessment
Demand
for goods
and
services
Choice of
technologies
and
practices
Flux of
material
outputs
and inputs
Valued
environmental
properties
Exposure
of people
and things
Consequences
to people and
the things
they value
Source: Derived from Jäger (2000)
1.2 Definition of carbon risks at a micro-level
To investigate the effects of environmental risks at the micro level, the causal chain approach
is now structured and applied at the corporate level. Thus, the methodology of the causal
chain approach can be projected on company’s chain of value-added processes (in the
following: process chain); a corporation can be viewed as a process chain with different
physical inputs (materials, energy), specific operations (production process) and one or
several outputs (products or services).
To distinguish the potential impacts of carbon risks on the output side, the risks can be
divided into direct and indirect risks. The former describes direct physical impacts on a
company’s assets. The latter encompasses impacts such as political consequences, consumer
boycotts, and regulative measures (emission taxes, emission trading). Direct and indirect
climate change risks have an impact on the process chain at different levels mainly depending
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on the industry, the location, and the asset mix of the company.4 Furthermore, an overall risk
assessment based on the idea of the process chain has to include carbon risks derived from the
input-side of a company. In terms of climate change these are all risks related with the supply
fossil fuels.
Figure 1.2 Carbon risks at the corporate level
CARBON RISKS
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direct effects direct effects indirect effects
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1.3 Scope of the study and methodology
Climate change risks and their correlation to different economic indicators have been
evaluated, both in qualitative and quantitative ways. The focus of chapter two is to review the
literature and to give an overview on the different studies done so far in the field of assessing
and evaluating climate change risk. It is shown that the focus so far has been on the
assessment of carbon risks from an output perspective.
Chapter three extends the view on carbon risks and introduces an input perspective into the
risk analysis. Input oriented carbon risks consist of all carbon dioxide (CO2) emitting input
factors; other greenhouse gases (GHGs) are not considered. Nevertheless, a main source of
climate change causing factors is incorporated by this definition due to the fact that carbon
dioxide is estimated to be responsible for 60 % of global warming. In addition to that this
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paper does not include the discussion of carbon sinks and sequestration.5 Although it might be
an interesting aspect to scrutinize, if and how emitted carbon dioxides could be (re)utilized to
reduce input scarcity.
As the analysis of all fossil fuels and other carbon inputs would break the limits of this paper,
this paper could just focus on the conditions of oil as one main carbon input factor and the
specific risk exposure. However, “considering that cheap oil based energy has been the
lifeblood of the world’s economy over the best part of this century”6 and the actual discussion
on economic effects of high oil prices, one core issue of future risk assessment challenges is
covered by this survey. In chapter four the Value-at-Risk (VaR) concept is presented as a tool
for assessing oil scarcity.
The price and the volatility are the main variables of the VaR function. These variables are
explained for crude oil in chapter five and linked with the VaR approach. In chapter six,
different scenarios are developed based on existing forecasts and calculations. These
scenarios cover different oil price estimations and show how the VaR of oil could develop.
Finally, chapter seven sums up the main findings, presents possible ways of integrating the
developed tool into corporate and financial market risk management, and gives suggestions
for further research.
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2 Carbon risks from an output perspective – climate
change
The contemporary literature discusses innumerable links in terms of climate change and it’s
causes and effects. Furthermore, a number of approaches and studies try to identify, determine
or evaluate related risks from a financial perspective. This chapter presents the current state-
of-the-art of this discussion. Part one presents regression studies illustrating how the risks of
climate change have been priced on financial markets in the past. Furthermore, it includes
quantitative studies, which have examined the correlation between emission costs and
financial performance. The second section reviews qualitative studies and surveys including
theoretical analysis of climate risk at a corporate level and possible future impacts of climate
change on economic development derived from estimations and scenarios. The third section
reflects on how markets or the business community perceive and evaluate climate change
risks and how they deal with this issue. The enquiries and polls provide a summary of the
present expectations on climate change risk. The different methodologies and findings are not
commented; a finale part summarizes the key findings and provides concluding remarks.
2.1 Quantitative and regression studies
GARZ, H./VOLK, C. (2003), “Von Economics zu Carbonomics – Value at Risk durch
Klimawandel”
Methodology: The study analyses climate change from a macro-economic point of view and
describes different models of assessment for climate change (top-down and bottom-up). To
calculate the Market-Value-at-Risk (MVaR) Garz and Volk use scenarios and the DICE-
Model7 developed by Nordhaus (1994). Furthermore, the authors use a cross-sectional
regression-model based on data taken from 49 industries to examine the correlation between
climate change and shareholder value.
Key findings: Based on calculations the worldwide MVaR is between US$ 192 and 915
billion. Neither climate exposure nor management quality has had a significant influence on
the post-Rio-return. Thus, climate change is not a priced factor of risk yet; companies with a
high climate-exposure have to face a potential valuation discount. There is a significant
correlation between the climate-exposure and the G.A.R.P. value and growth scores (special
score developed by the WestLB8). At the sector level, a high climate change exposure is
positive correlated to the management quality: a high management quality decreases the Beta-
risk9 and increases the chances of growth.
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8
 For more information see Garz et al. 2001
9
 The Beta-risk is the central risk-measurement of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
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RUTH, M./ DAVIDSDOTTIR, B./LAITNER S. (2000), “ Impacts of market-based
climate change policies on the US pulp and paper industry”
Methodology: This study assesses the potential impacts of climate change policies on energy
consumption and emissions in the US pulp and paper industry. A model consisting of four
interrelated modules is developed to estimate (a) future technological potentials and (b)
energy and policy induced expenditures. The data is used to examine the industry’s response
to increased cost of carbon for the years 1995 to 2020.10 Furthermore, the impacts of
investment incentives on the diffusion of energy efficient technology are analyzed.
Key findings: The conclusion is that industry responses to cost increases are time delayed due
to the adoption procedures. In all scenarios the increase in world energy demand outpaces the
development of energy saving technologies in the short and medium run. Energy expenditures
range from US$ 37.99 to 42.47 for each ton of output. An investment led climate policy is the
only way to overcome the 3 to 4 year time lag following implementation of climate change
policy.
KING, A./LENOX, M. (2001), “Does It Really Pay to Be Green? An Empirical Study of
Firm Environmental and Financial Performance”
Methodology: King and Lenox analyze the market valuation of 652 manufacturing firms in
the U.S. related to their total emissions from 1987 to 1996. Beyond an overview of empirical
studies done so far, the empirical part uses a fixed effect regression including dummy
variables to eliminate possible differences between companies. Tobin’s q11 and data from
Compustat database12 are applied to measure the financial performance. To determine the
environmental performance three different emission variables13 are developed and figures on
emission are taken from the TRI14 database.
Key Findings: Lower total emissions are correlated with better financial performance. As a
significant result companies with relatively lower emissions tend to have superior financial
results than other companies in the same industry. On the other hand it is not significant that
companies with cleaner industries have a better financial performance.
RUSSO, M./FOUTS, P. (1997), “A Resource-Based Perspective on Corporate
Environmental Performance and Profitability”
Methodology: Russo and Fouts try to prove two hypotheses in their study: (1) High levels of
environmental performance are associated with enhanced profitability. (2) The level of an
industry’s growth determines the relationship between environmental performance and
profitability. The authors analyze 243 U.S. firms and apply a least squares regression method
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 See Ruth et al. 2000
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 Tobin’s q measures the market value of a firm relative to the replacement costs of tangible assets, see
Lindenberg/Ross 1981 or Lewellen/Badrinath 1997.
12
 http://www.compustat.com/www/db/me_lev3_01_db.html
13
 These are: (1) Total emissions, the log of total facility emissions; (2) Relative emissions, compare the
company’s environmental performance within the industry; (3) Industry emissions, the tendency to operate in
a clean or dirty industry sector.
14
 Toxic Release Inventory, for more information see http://www.epa.gov/tri/chemical/chemlist2001.pdf
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to examine the correlation between a company’s environmental performance and it’s return
on assets over a two year period (1991 to 1992).
Key findings: Both hypotheses were confirmed by the regression analyses. Returns on assets
are positively correlated to higher environmental performance at a very significant level. An
increase in environmental performance had a positive effect on a firm’s ROA in a growing
industry.
STANWICK, P./STANWICK, S. (1998), “The Relationship between Corporate Social
Performance and Organizational Size, Financial Performance, and Environmental
Performance: An Empirical Examination”
Methodology: Stanwick and Stanwick examine the effects of low emission levels on a
company’s profitability based on the yearly profits as well as their level of corporate social
responsibility based on the ranking in the Fortune Corporate Reputation Index (CRI). The
basis for the investigation is data of the years 1987 to 1992.
Key findings: In general a high level of variation in profitability and the level of emissions is
observed. There is a significant correlation between CRI, low emission levels and profitability
in two out of six years and a significant positive relationship between the level of emissions
and profitability in five out of six years. The authors point out that the level of emissions as a
measurement for environmental performance disadvantages firms in relatively low polluting
industries, thus there is a bias towards “heavy manufacturing firms”.
2.2 Qualitative studies and surveys
FIGGE, F. (1998), “Systematisierung ökonomischer Risiken durch globale Umwelt-
probleme – Gefahr für Finanzmärkte?”
Methodology: Figge states that the portfolio management is confronted with conventional risk
as well as risks related to ecology. He differentiates risks by the time of decision-making (pre-
decisional and post-decisional) and by dependency (horizontal and vertical division). In his
paper he discusses the problem of risk perception on financial markets in general and draws
conclusion for the advanced risk management. As an example for global environmental risks
he refers to climate change.
Key findings: From an ecological point of view, all risks belong to both the horizontal and
vertical division. The risk for financial markets related to ecological sources is caused by the
lack of information about ecological induced risks. Global environmental problems and
related risks become more and more systematic, as there is a growing dependency between
single risks. As the potential for elimination through diversification decreases, he defines a
systematical increase of ecological induced economical risks.15
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INNOVEST STRATEGIC VALUE ADVISORS (2002), “Climate Change & The
Financial Services Industry. Module 1 – Threats and Opportunities”
Methodology: The authors commence with an ex ante analysis of financial impacts of climate
change on the economy so far. Section four compares opportunities and threats for both
insurance and finance industry. This qualitative analysis assessed financial figures and
estimations from different scientific and institutional sources and outlines possible impacts on
institutional investors. The report concludes with recommendations for the different sectors.
Key findings: Based on future outlooks and scenarios16 the authors argue that abatement of
GHG is economically feasible. There is an increase in economic losses due to natural
disasters, which are doubling every ten years, and have reached almost US$ 1 trillion over the
past 15 years. Even small changes (< 10%) in the severity of weather events related to climate
change can generate multiple increases. The study draws conclusions in different areas, e.g.
foreign direct investment or project finance. As a result it is stated that insurance companies
and asset management companies are challenged to ensure viability of their business and
investments.
INNOVEST STRATEGIC VALUE ADVISORS (2002a), “Value at Risk: Climate
Change and the Future of Governance”
Methodology: Innovest puts emphasis on the importance of the topic climate change for
investors as “universal owner”. The study conducts the role of institutional investors as they
have to face (a) economic risks from damages due to climate change and (b) exposures to the
costs of GHG-abatement. A sector specific analysis and implications for CEOs as well as
institutional investors conclude the study.
Key findings: Estimations about the size of GHG emissions trading market range from US$
10 billion by 2005 to US$ 60 billion and even US$ 1 trillion in an unspecified timeframe.17
Five main risks and potential impacts on shareholder value are identified for all sectors:
Balance sheet risk, market and “reputational” risk, capital cost risk, operating risk and
business sustainability risk. Based on results of another Innovest study18 about the U.S.
electric utilities’ GHG emissions and climate risk exposures, the firm specific climate risk
expressed in terms of percentage of share price “at risk” can vary by a factor of nearly 60
times within the same industry.
MANSLEY, M./DLUGOLECKI, A. (2001), “Climate Change – A Risk Management
Challenge for Institutional Investors”
Methodology: The study focuses on institutional investors and their long-term view. It is
stated that institutional investors can have a huge impact on economic activity related to
climate change. The findings are based on data of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change. Mansley and Dlugolecki develop ten action points how to better manage climate
change risks.
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 See Innovest 2002b
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Key findings: The authors argue that institutional investors should adopt a more strategic
approach to climate change risk. Recognizing climate change as a risk factor for long-term
investment is crucial for successful investment. Both significant costs as well as net benefits
result due to potential economic impacts of emissions reductions. The paper points out that
brokers have the greatest capacity among financial institutions to carry out detailed research.
MANSLEY, M. (2003), “Sleeping Tiger, Hidden Liabilities: Amid growing risk and
industry movement on climate change, ExxonMobil falls farther behind”
Methodology: The report investigates the action ExxonMobil has undertaken concerning the
impacts of climate risk over a one-year period.19 Furthermore, Mansley compared Exxon-
Mobil with other companies like BP, Shell and ChevronTexaco in terms of strategies and
actions on the topic of climate change. Then he analyzed the different steps taken so far by
ExxonMobil responding to climate change risks.
Key findings: Mansley points out increasing pressure from evolving climate change policy as
one major risk. Furthermore, he identifies growing reputation risks and risks from litigation as
he states that the company refuses to take concrete steps into consideration. He concludes that
the company has internal problems.
2.3 Enquiries and Polls
MAIER, B. (2002), “Klimaänderungen und betriebswirtschaftliches Risikomanagement.
Am Beispiel der Wintersturmaktivitäten in Nordrhein-Westfahlen”, empirical part
Methodology: Mayer examines in his book the consequences of climate change related risks
and the economical impacts on business entities. The enclosed questionnaire encompasses
questions about a company’s expected impacts of ecological and climate risks, the company’s
actions related to winter storms, and the risk management tools applied in the company. The
poll comprises of 260 firms.
Key findings: One striking outcome of the study is that two thirds of the questioned
companies only had a planning horizon for climate change events of less than five years; 30
% are even planning just two years or less. This confirms results of other empirical studies20
that economic agents tend to ignore events with a low probability occurrence like natural
catastrophes. Companies that have already been affected by damages from storms are going to
include climate change risks in their overall risk management. Companies with a longer
planning horizon or more than 200 employees are more likely to incorporate climate change
risk in their management strategies. Furthermore, the relevance of climate risk for the risk
management is correlated to the company’s location.
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COGAN, D. G. (2003), “Corporate Governance and Climate Change: Making the
Connection”, CERES Sustainable Governance Project Report
Methodology: The study examines the business strategies and governance practices related to
the topic of climate change of 20 of the world’s biggest corporate emitters of greenhouse
gases. A 14-point "Climate Change Governance Checklist" is used to identify each company’s
action related to climate change risks. The checklist is divided into the categories: board
structure and environmental oversight, management accountability and environmental
auditing, disclosure on climate change, and Inventories of GHG emissions.
Key findings: The results show that 17 companies have environmental committees at the
corporate board level. The level of engagement differs: mainly European oil and gas
companies are investing at least small portions in renewable energy sources, whereas
American oil corporations are mainly concentrating in traditional fossil fuels. The worst
ranking was received by the American utilities sector, which has only reached seven action
points on average.
INNOVEST STRATEGIC VALUE ADVISORS (2003 and 2004), “Climate Change and
Shareholder Value In 2004”; “Carbon Finance and the Global Equity Markets”
Methodology: In 2003 the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) published the first results of the
FT500 Global Index companies’ request. This was followed by the follow up version in 2004.
In 2003 35 institutional investors representing assets in excess of US$ 4.5 trillion were
involved, in 2004 it were 95 institutional investors representing US$10 trillion. The investors
request the disclosure of investment relevant information relating to the risks and
opportunities presented by climate change.
Key findings: The 2004 report states that the mainstream investment community has realized
the financial implications of climate change; financial markets are starting to see that risks
and opportunities take shape. Thus, companies are likely to face increased pressure from
financial markets in dealing with climate risk factors. Climate change and shareholder interest
are becoming more closely intertwined: 59% of firms responded to CDP2 (47% in CDP1).
45% of the FT500 believe climate change represents risk and/or opportunity. 65% of
companies in high-impact sectors are now measuring and reporting emissions versus 51% in
CDP1. Significant differences of opinion remain within same sectors on the importance of
climate change to company business and competitiveness. Many companies still remain
firmly ‘behind the curve’.
2.4 Conclusion – climate change risk
Quantitative and regression studies analyzed companies from different industries as well as
different regions and tested a wide variety of environmental indicators and their effects on the
financial performance. The results point out the consensus that financial markets have
recognized a correlation between environmental performance and corporate profitability.
These results are confirmed by a more comprehensive compilation published by Murphy
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(2002) and a study focused on European stock companies conducted by the Centre for
European Economic Research.21
But climate change is not an explicitly priced risk factor: On the one hand regression studies
using total emissions of a company as a measurement for climate change risk found that lower
emissions have an positive impact on shareholder value. On the other hand authors stated that
financial markets do not incorporate the risks in determining risk premium rates so far.
According to the enquiries, climate change risks and related abatement costs differ between
industries and regions; and the approaches towards risk management vary within sectors.
These outcomes are similar to a more general study about sustainability and shareholder
value, conducted by Deutsches Aktieninstitut/European Business School (2003). The sector
analyzing studies illustrate that oil & gas, automobile, transport, energy, tourism, and utilities
industry are likely to be the most vulnerable for climate risks. According to Mansley and
Dlugolecki (2001) different types of climate change risks can be defined:
• Direct physical impacts of climate change,
• Potential catastrophes due to climate change,
• International political consequences of climate change, and
• Business and economic risks of policy failures.
Garz and Volk (2003) are structuring the risks into first order effects, which are similar to
Mansely’s first two points, and second order effects, which are similar to Mansley’s last two
points. The considered literature identified first order risks such as:
• Potential destruction of infrastructure through extreme weather events,
• Potential water scarcity in the agrarian sector,
• Potential impacts on the tourism industry, and
• Potential spreading of tropical diseases.
Risks of second order derive from:
• Potential climate change policies,
• Additional adaptation costs related to changes in production processes,
• Changes in consumption behavior, and
• Short term adjustments of contract conditions.
Although there is increasing scientific evidence about climate change22 and confirmations of
world business leaders that climate change is the greatest challenge facing the world at the
beginning of the 21st Century, it can be stated that there is no significant reaction: the business
community and the financial markets do not counteract this development in a sufficient
manner. This is a crucial outcome, especially as indirect risks from climate change are
becoming a reality:
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• European emission trading scheme is going to start 2005.23
• It is likely that more carbon taxes emerge in the near future.24
• The lowering of stock ratings by equity analysts.25
Companies might have to face this issue not only as a strategic factor for success and
competitiveness but also due to legal reasons. For example the German Corporate Governance
Codex already requests corporate boards of publicly listed companies to disclose any issues
that are relevant or could have impact on the financial situation of the corporation.26 Thus,
climate change as a business case will be a viable topic in future annual general meetings.
Furthermore, reactions on markets are naturally not only based on hard facts. Especially on
stock and derivative markets, decisions usually include expectations and anticipations. In
terms of carbon risks, these rather soft facts already have negative effects on companies’
performance, as it is illustrated by Xstrata (FTSE 100 listed company): In 2002 the Japanese
government announced that they were considering a coal levy, which would be put into effect
in Oct 2003. The shares of Xstrata – as one large coal exporter to Japan – fell approximately
10% in a few days due to the likely impact of such a move.27 Furthermore, Standard & Poor
has already warned of the effects of emissions trading on cost structure and profitability of
European utility corporations. Inevitably this is going to be monitored by the rating results.28
Thus, the conclusion of the status quo analysis is: climate change is not only a matter of fact;
it is also going to be a crucial business topic. For comprehensive and reliable risk perception,
corresponding assessments should already be the business case. And this is applicable to all
companies, whereby the individual intensity is in dependency of the specific industrial sector
and size of the company. According to Figge (1998), global environmental risks such as
climate change show a different structure than conventional risks; they are becoming more
systematic as there is an increasing dependency between the risk factors over time periods.29
But current assessment tools obviously have a lack of embedding these risks in an adequate
manner. This might be due to the complexity of the risks. In this context Chichilnisky and
Heal (1993) state that the concern climate change has two elements: the global nature of
possible changes and the fact that they are driven by human activity. They conclude that the
risks posed by climate change are endogenous and so (still) outside of the classical economic
framework for analyzing risk allocation. However, as this type of risk gains more and more
systematic features, there is a growing necessity to consider this issue, for both managers and
financial analysts. Shareholders and investors should reinforce their claim for disclosure of
climate change risks and how companies are intending to manage this issue.
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3 Carbon Risks from an input perspective – the
resource oil
From the current perspective on the process chain, carbon risks seem mainly be affected in the
output dimension. Discussions therefore focus on methods of risk reduction by mitigation,
adaptation, and end-of-pipe approaches. Input oriented risks seem to be not relevant yet.
But companies’ operations are determined and influenced by input factors; financial calcula-
tions and investment decisions are based on predictions and assumptions due to future price
and availability conditions. If markets anticipate increasing resource scarcity, this will result
in a tangible risk factor; and this needs to be incorporated in the analysis of corporations’
profitability. Thus, the idea of this paper is to develop a sustainable risk management tool that
takes into consideration the possible negative financial impacts of natural given oil scarcity.
The latter is defined as scarcity risks derived from limited resources due to exploitation and
restricted access.30
In economic terms a resource is scarce when the quantity supplied is not sufficient to satisfy
demand. Normally this would result in an upward pressure in price. But even before a
resource is ultimately exhausted, the risk due to scarcity will emerge; and capital markets will
price this as a matter of fact. The crucial question is whether this risk will emerge slightly or
suddenly and prices will increase slowly or exponentially? The dilemma is how to forecast the
potential developments, especially when the expected effects rely on market’s acknowledg-
ment of occurred scarcity. This chapter considers oil as a risk factor in general; chapter five is
focused on the market and price reactions.
3.1 Risks of oil as an input factor
Oil can be defined as a “private exhaustible natural resource”31 as it is in private ownership
and not a public good. The existing stock can never increase, hence the supply is fixed and it
is provided by nature.32 Since the birth of the oil industry in the middle of the 18th century the
economy’s demand for oil steadily increased as it became vital for transport and agriculture.33
World oil production increased to 78.6 million barrels a day in July 2003.34 Up to now, world
oil consumption has increased by 11.6 % since 1992 and is likely to increase further.35 The
consumption in Asia (including China and Japan) even increased by 26.9 % over the same
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period. Worldwide consumption of oil exceeds US$ 500 billion and oil is the world’s most
actively traded commodity, accounting for about 10 % of total world trade.36
Oil’s multiple applications in today’s economy range from the source for different kinds of
energy to the basic input factor for numerous production processes. Thus, it covers a wide
range of economic sectors, which increases the universality of the topic. The importance does
not only derive from the size of the market, but also from its strategic role for oil importing
and exporting countries. Recent developments on the resource markets have already urged
experts to warn for negative economic effects due to increasing prices; the supply of crude oil,
increasing demand and the resulting oil prices are one major issue.37
The particular characteristics of the oil market and economy’s dependency on oil as an input
factor create a highly complex and unpredictable environment. However, unless it is not
possible to uncouple GDP-growth from oil consumption, higher economic growth will result
in increased demand for oil. It can be presumed that this development will be reinforced by
accelerated economic growth in emerging markets. If there is no significant action taken
towards matching future demand and supply, this will end up in shortages and “shortages
means scarcity and higher prices.”38
This environment bears immense risks for single companies and entire value chain as well as
for actors in financial markets investing in this business sectors. The derived risk for business
became evident in 1999, when Shell’s operations in Nigeria were able to produce only 25 %
of capacity due to national and international protest movements and sabotage from local
community.39 Obviously, for many companies unstable oil prices already present a severe
risk.40 As a result, companies (not only petrochemical firms) engaged in risk management
activities to protect their corporations from volatile input prices. This is indicated by the climb
in trading volume of New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX)41 crude oil future contracts.
The annual trading volumes of No. 2 heating oil future contracts42 grew from 25,910 in 1978
to 9.6 million in 2000.43 And this development seems to continue due to oil prices become
more sensitive to rumors and misinformation.44 As there is an increasing need for accurate
risk management, a comprehensive model for risk quantification is required. Estimations and
calculations of future oil price volatilities are essential, not only for the derivative markets,
but also for companies’ budget planning.
In general, scarcity risks due to oil can be described in two dimensions: (1) In the short-run
price fluctuations affect the delivery and distribution of oil and can thus interrupt or disturb
single production processes. Ensuing supply delays or reduced production capacities result in
higher costs from increased risk management activities or contract penalties. (2) In the long-
run uncertainty about future production conditions due to higher oil prices and increased
volatility impede accurate and reliable investment planning for both, managers and investors.
Actual costs might increase the underlying calculations. Thus, expenditures for future
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investment projects cannot be calculated in an exact manner. It is more likely that expected
returns on investments cannot be realized and therefore entire projects or investments are
canceled or not conducted. Both, the short and long term risks related to oil scarcity can be
derived from the availability and the oil price.
Figure 3.1 Structure of oil scarcity risks
Increasing scarcity
Risk of availability Risks of oil price
    - Price level
   - Volatility
Risks of oil availability encompass all sources that could possibly irritate or prevent the
needed – i.e. demanded – oil supply.45 This paper primary considers the risk of availability
due to restrictions by nature. In the context of the scenarios options for substitutions, change
of technology, and alternative inputs are discussed but not incorporated in detail. The
following other possible restrictions are not contemplated in an explicit way and therefore
considered to be constant:
• Taxes, levies and other government related measures46
• Change of consumer preferences
• Political developments, especially in oil delivering countries
3.2 Resource scarcity in theory
As one option for assessing the overall significance of resource scarcity the focus can be laid
on physical indicators: Based on reliable sources of information physical measures such as
reserve-to-use ratios enable assessments over time and direct comparison with other
resources. But corresponding figures do not provide tangible information about the signifi-
cance and actuality of current scarcity perceptions reflected by market behaviors and trends.
Beyond physical approaches, economic indicators can obtain this type of information.
According to economic theory scarcity is usually combined with rising prices; under the
assumption of constant or increasing demand, the price tends to be negatively related to the
size of the stock.47 This entails the smaller the stock, the higher the price and vice versa.
Hotelling (1931) wrote one of the most famous contributions to the theory of exhaustible
resources and resource prices. In the neo-classical tradition he assumes profit maximization
behavior by the resource owner and efficient markets for resources and future resources
contracts. Furthermore, all agents are subject to perfect information. Different resources are
used in order of their specific extraction costs. Extraction costs can vary due to the geo-
graphical accessibility, related transportation costs or the geological differences. According to
the Hotelling-principle, under certainty about future prices and perfect competition among
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producers, the unit price of an exhaustible resource less the marginal cost of extracting should
rise over time at a rate of interest equal to the risk less return. The extraction costs are likely
to increase over time, as companies will always try to extract low cost resources first. Thus,
prices are likely to increase over time with greater scarcity and as a market effect demand
eventually decreases over time. Barnett and Morse (1963) showed that none of these
theoretical ideas became reality. They proved that resource prices did not provide any
significant evidence for scarcity, except for forest products. They argue that extraction costs
have decreased over time, while extracted quantities of natural resources have increased. The
interpretation is that technological improvement and substitutes are a type of mitigating
factors and seem to eliminate all evidence of scarcity.48
A rather new approach considers uncertainty about resource endowments and market failures
as standard. Reynolds (1999) suggests that an adequate measure for scarcity is provided by
exploration costs. These costs are influenced by the information effect (the more information
about resource location exist, the cheaper the exploration) and the depletion effect (the fewer
resources available, the costlier the exploration). Reynolds’ model assumes that the true
scarcity will be only revealed towards the end of the exhaustion. This could cause a sudden
and sharp increase in resource prices, even after decades of declining prices.
Supporters of new institutional economics suggest that one possible explanation for certain
inefficiencies on resource markets is path-dependency. Antonelli (1997) defines path-
dependency as “the set of dynamic processes where small events have long-lasting cones-
quences that economic action at each moment can modify yet only to a limited extent.”49 In
the context of scarcity, this means that agents in resource markets stick to old consumption
patterns and have difficulties or obstacles for changing their behavior. This might be due to
switching costs when facing new technological opportunities and sunk costs of assets.
Switching to a new – e.g. more resource efficient – technology is combined to certain costs,
such as the purchasing price or installation costs. Although it is obvious that resources are
used in a non-efficient way, the decision is to stick to an existing investment project due to
sunk costs. Thus, the actors’ behavior on markets is often biased or non-rational. As an effect,
path-dependencies can be the reason for less commitment in the development of large
technological innovations.50 In this context also the game theory approach can be utilized to
analyze the interactions between different suppliers and their bargaining strategies.
After this short review on the economic explanation for resource scarcity in theory, the focus
is now on the exhaustible resource oil. Discrepancies between the Hotelling-principle and the
actual scarcity patterns are described by Reynolds’ model and path-dependencies.
3.3 Oil endowment
The world’s endowment with oil is structured into reserves and resources. Campbell (1997)
refers to reserves as the amounts of petroleum that are estimated to be recoverable from a
known petroleum accumulation as of a stated reference date on certain or implied economic
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and technological assumptions. Normally reserves describe the current or foreseen overall
extractions of a field at the reference date. Another general accepted definition refers to
reserves as the known amounts of a mineral that can be profitably recovered at current prices
– for the mineral and the inputs used in extracting and processing it.51 One common definition
of resources is: resources cover a deposit as a whole; the quantity, which is already located
for exploitation, is then defined as reserves.52
The cumulative production is the total amount of oil produced in an area. The cumulative
production worldwide, included all technical possible explorations over the time, is referred to
as ultimate recovery. The figures of estimated ultimate recovery build the basis for world oil
outlooks. Table 3.1 gives an overview about recent estimations on world’s reserves, resources
and ultimate recovery of oil.
Table 3.1 Estimations on reserves, resources and ultimate recovery (bill. barrels)
Editor Reserves Resources Estimated ultimate
recovery
Int. Energy Agency
(2002) 959 939 1898
BP Amoco (2002) 1047 - -
Hubbert Centre
(2002) 900 150 1050
ODAC (2000) 996 144 1140
United States Geolo-
gical Survey (2001) 2568
Every forecast uses its own methodology in determining the ultimate recovery and its own
model to estimate undiscovered resources. The divergence of the estimations is mainly due to
the different estimation techniques. In general it can be stated that the Hubbert Centre
produces a rather pessimistic view, while the United States Geological Survey delivers an
optimistic view on world’s endowment of oil. In general it can be stated that recent figures on
ultimate recovery show a trend towards a value of approximately 2000 billion barrels.53 This
could indicate an increasing consensus on the world’s endowment of oil; at least recent
discussions prevail a common opinion about scarcity in a rather short-term future.54
3.4 Future oil supply
Hubbert explained oil discovery and production both form a bell-shaped curve over time,
known as the Hubbert-curve.55 The production rate as a function of time starts at zero. After it
has reached a peak it declines back again to zero. The area beneath the curve shows the
graphical measurement for the cumulative production. The Hubbert-curve illustrates that the
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decline in oil production flattens by time. Hence, the question about the ultimate last barrel is
less important and not much of practical use in the context of this survey. In light of scarcity it
is important when the peak of the Hubbert-curve is reached and the cumulative production
cannot be further increased. This peak is defined as depletion mid-point. At the depletion mid-
point about half of the oil-field’s, country’s or world’s reserves have been produced. In
theory, peak production and the depletion mid-point should coincide. But through technical
interference or quota regulation production can be held up (or even increased) artificially for a
few years. Table 3.2 summarizes different estimations on the depletion mid-point.
Table 3.2 Estimations on peak production and depletion mid-point
Editor Peak production
(year)
Peak production
(tons/year)
Depletion mid-
point (year)
Odell (1997) 2025 6,5 bill. 2016
Campbell (1997) 2008 3,3 bill. 2000
Edwards (1997) 2020 4,8 bill. 2015
Hiller (1997) 2017 4,4 bill. 2013
ODAC (2001) 2005
L-B Systemtechnik
GmBH (2000)
2005
Source: Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (2000) and L-B Systemtechnik GmbH (2000)
In this context it is important to note that the depletion mid-point is reached before peak
production. From this point of view it is assumed that consumption will still increase while
natural endowment will accelerate the path to its final depletion point. Future supply might
not just be limited by the natural endowment of world oil resources, but also determined by
access to reserves. As the World Resources Institute (2002) puts it: “As traditional oil pro-
ducing regions mature and yield progressively less oil, the industry is increasingly exploring
and producing in new areas, where environmental and social controversies may be
significant.” However, “if economic growth remains technologically dependent on growth in
conventional oil supply until global conventional oil production peaks, then the development
following the peak is unpredictable.”56
3.5 Future oil demand
Considering the future oil demand several factors have to be distinguished that determine the
scope of demand:
• Development of the oil price
• Technological know-how, opportunities of substitution, alternative input factors
• Energy and supply structure
• Growth in GDP
• Political and social developments
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Theses factors have to be considered for investigating the question how oil prizes are
stimulated by the demand site. Table 3.3 presents scenarios by the International Energy
Agency on the possible development of per capita world oil demand.
Table 3.3 Oil consumption prospects per capita, kg oil/year
Reference scenario 2000 2010 2020
Developing Countries 560 670 800
Transition Countries 2925 3590 4160
OECD Countries 4800 5200 5500
Source: The Danish Board of Technology (2003)
In the short run the price elasticity of oil can be seen as quite low, as the substitution of assets
using oil as input factor is time consuming and requires financial resources. Until now today’s
world economy is technologically unprepared for substituting oil as an input factor.57 But in
the long run the development of new, oil-independent technologies and the use of alternative
energy sources are inevitable; the figures on oil endowment and future supply illustrate that
the supply cannot match the demand in a sustainable way.
3.6 Conclusion – oil scarcity
First of all, it has to be stated that it is difficult to analyze precisely physical oil conditions due
to the uncertainty related to location, extent, and quality of deposits.58 Furthermore, it is not
easy – or almost impossible – to foresee the aforementioned restrictions in a precise manner.
Nevertheless, oil is one of the most tangible examples for a finite resource; there is general
consensus that oil scarcity emerges sooner or later after oil production has peaked and
demand for oil cannot be met. The question therefore is, when will the peak be reached and
when can the demand not be met any longer? The amount of oil in newly discovered fields
has been decreasing for the last four decades; and for the last two decades the discovery rate is
smaller than the rate of oil production.59 This could indicate that the downgrading already has
started and the ensuring consequences have to be faced: “Depleting finite stocks of fossil fuels
closes our future options in a way that depreciating a capital stock does not, in that the former
is irreversible while the latter is not.”60 In order to grasp this topic from a risk management
perspective, the further focus is on the Value-at-Risk model.
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4 Value-at-Risk
For an effective risk management the impact of oil scarcity needs to be quantified in a figure
and observed over time. Capital market models can be harnessed for modeling potential
effects and transferring historical data into a new model. The Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach
was developed for portfolio managers and analysts; the results express risk quantifications in
monetary units.61 This single number provides a standardized risk measure; it generates “a
common language with respect to risk”62 for investors and management.
4.1 Definition of VaR
Value-at-Risk measures the maximum potential loss in the value of a portfolio of financial
instruments with a given probability. A typical VaR model will put a figure on the chances of
losing no more than a certain amount of money over a defined time period. From a statistical
point of view, VaR can be defined as a biased confidence interval. Jorion (2000) refers to the
VaR as “the maximum amount one can expect to lose of a given position during a given
period (the potential close out period) with a predefined probability.”
Several regulatory institutions support VaR methods for quantifying risks. For example the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision suggests VaR for a bank’s risk assessment in
capital allocation and the Group of Thirty (an international group of derivative dealers)
proposed that dealers should calculate a VaR as a routine business practice for managing
risk.63 There is an increasing number of VaR–tools employed in companies’ risk management
operations. JP Morgan developed the VaR estimation system RiskMetricsTM, Credit Swiss
First Boston released Primerisk and PrimeClear in 1997, Chase Manhattan employs Charisma
and Deutsche Bank is using the dbAnalyst.64
Nevertheless, the VaR model has three critical points:65 (1) Assessments assume that the
returns conform to a particular pattern. Risk managers define their confidence in a certain
outcome, but the patterns of financial markets never can be considered as certain. (2) There is
always the possibility of “fat tails”. Even so a likely risk is predicted, there is always the
option that this chance suddenly increases (e.g. by new or not encompassed factors). (3)
Furthermore, the model relies on ex post data and assumes that markets will continue to
develop similarly in future. But as covariances are mostly not stable, markets are likely to
adhere to this role as well as to go in the opposite direction. These three points are more
crucial on daily assessments on capital markets than in this survey. Although, it has to be kept
in mind that VaR is a mathematical model with is advantages in quantifying risks as well as
disadvantages of statistical errors.
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4.2 Calculation of VaR
In general VaR consists of a measurement for volatility, the distribution of the underlying
yield and an evaluation model.66 Based on that, Fallon (1996) derived
Prob[∆P(∆t, ∆x)>-VAR] = 1 - α Equation 4.1
for the VaR as a one-sided confidence interval. Within a given period the value of a portfolio
∆P depends on the forecast horizon ∆t and the vector ∆x changes in risk factors. The
confidence variable α has to be determined and depends on the risk tolerance of the portfolio
manager. Normally the value ranges between 1% and 10%.67 The choice of the confidence
level is discretionary and differs across institutions.68 From Equation 4.1 the VaR formula is
derived
VaR = S0 Z(α) σs Equation 4.2
Where
S0 is the underlying,
Z(α) is the z-value of the normal distribution,
σs is the volatility of the underlying.
VaR can be calculated for different time periods; this depends on the volatility intervals. For
example to calculate the one-month VaR of an underlying, the average monthly volatility
needs to be determined. Under the assumption that the return of the underlying S is normally
distributed and the confidence level is 95 % Dockner and Harold define the VaR as
VaR = S0 1,65 σs Equation 4.3
Where σs describes the volatility and the z-value of 1,65 the quartile of the standard
distribution. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution curve of different returns rt/σt. Under the
assumption that rt/σt are normally distributed and the confidence level is determined at 95 %,
there is a 5 % chance that within the forecast horizon ∆t the loss of the portfolio value ∆P will
be higher than the VaR.
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Figure 4.1 Value-at-Risk graphic
Source: JP Morgan/Reuters (1996)
Example: An investor has a 10 million Euro position of share A in his portfolio and intends to
calculate the VaR of this position over a 1-day horizon with a 5 % probability. Share A’s
daily volatility is assumed to be 1.5 % (derived from the daily average standard deviation).
Under the assumption of normal distribution, the VaR with a confidence level of 0.95 is
located at the z-value of 1.65. Thus the VaR is calculated by multiplying the volatility with
the z-value: 1.65*1.5 % = 2.475 %. The monetary VaR of this position is derived from the
market value:
EUR 10 million * 2.475 % = EUR 247.500
This means that with a 95 % probability share A’s value is not likely to decrease for more
than EUR 247.500 over the next day.
Value-at-Risk
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5 Value-at-Risk and Oil
This chapter is focused on the variables of the VaR method and how this model can be
applied to the scarcity risk of oil. Thus, this risk is not defined and scrutinized as a single risk
of increasing prices but also as a risk of uncertainty and volatile markets. This approach is
based on Cabedo and Moya (2003), who suggest that the VaR approach is directly applicable
to oil prices. In chapter four the VaR was defined as the product of the underlying’s spot
price, it’s volatility, and the z-value. The z-value is a discretionary variable, hence the two
missing variables to calculate the VaR of oil, are the future oil price and its volatility.
5.1 The oil price
The world oil market is a capital-intensive environment influenced by multiple interactions
deriving from the wide variety of products, transportation/storage issues and environmental
regulations.69 According to Adelmann (1993) there are three assumptions about the oil price:
1. The current price is the long-run competitive price, plus an error in estimation.
2. Due to inevitable scarcity the long-run competitive price must rise.
3. The price does not mirror oil scarcity and is determined by cartels (e.g. OPEC).
Applying the Hotelling-rule, oil fields are exploited in order of their extraction costs. Under
the assumptions of efficient markets, increasing prices would reflect oil scarcity and
eventually determine supply and demand. Reynolds (1999) and Antonelli (1997) suggest that
resource markets do not work efficiently due to uncertainty and market failures. Based on
theses assumptions and economic theories, the question rises whether a rule or common
pattern can be identified, which is able to explain the actual development of the oil price.
5.1.1 Past oil prices
In the long-term view the average crude oil price adjusted for inflation has been 18.63
US$/barrel since 1869.70 During the period from 1947 to 1997 the average oil price was 19.27
US$/barrel.71 These figures indicate a general increase; this is mainly caused due to three oil
price shocks that took place in the latter period:
• The oil embargo of 1973, where several Arab states proclaimed an embargo on oil
exports.
• The events surrounding the Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of the Shah-regime
in 1979, followed by the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980.
• The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the resulting second Gulf war in 1990.
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Beside political crisis, the oil price was also influenced by events such as natural disasters,
strikes, boycotts or accidents. A further important factor is OPEC, which was founded in
1960. The purpose was to stabilize prices by setting production quotas. The interactions
between all these factors create a complex and often uncertain situation on the oil market. In
order to reduce this uncertainty, the OPEC introduced a price band mechanism in 2000. This
so-called target zone model72 intends to keep the price of a barrel of crude oil within a US$ 22
to US$ 28 band. Figure 5.1 illustrates the Brent Crude oil price development since the
introduction of the target zone and illustrates its general effectiveness.
Figure 5.1 Brent Crude oil price development 01/03/2000 – 30/06/2003 & plotted price band
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Data: Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (US$/barrel), http://www.eia.doe.gov
In theory, the oil price is a function of the sum of: OPEC members’ assigned quotas, the
cumulative inventory shock at a given time, and the speed the market adjusts to output
changes.73 In practice, two main factors determine the oil price, in the case of the price
approaches the upper or lower limit of the price band: an actual intervention of OPEC or the
expectations of speculators that OPEC is going to intervene. As long as markets consider
OPEC as reliable, this instrument seems to work. But one disadvantage remains; the chance of
higher volatility increases, once the price approaches the price band.
5.1.2 Future oil price
Future oil price scenarios apply different depletion theories and diverse estimations on
ultimate recovery. Referring to Adelman, in the long term the price must rise in any case
because oil is a non-renewable resource.74 This is in accordance with the majority of the
considered forecasts. In the context of this survey, it was neither intended to generate an own
estimation nor to comment existing results.
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 This target zone model is similar to target zone models for foreign exchange markets, for more detailed
information see Krugman 1991.
73
 Compare Tang/Hammoudeh 2002, pp. 579-582
74
 See Adelman 1992, p. 269
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Table 5.1 Overview of nominal75 oil price estimations (in US$/barrel)
Author 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
EIA (Energy Information Agency), 2003  Reference 23,27 23,99 24,72 25,48 26,57
EIA (Energy Information Agency), 2003 - High Price 28,65 32,51 32,95 33,02 33,05
EIA (Energy Information Agency), 2003 - Low Price 22,04 19,04 19,04 19,04 19,04
Altos Partners, World Oil model (2002) 22,64 23,4 25,58 27,9 31,61
IEA, International Energy Agency (2003) 21,47 21,47 23,52 25,56 27,61
DBAB, Deutsche Bank Alex Brown Inc. (2003) 19,04 18,94 19,34 19,07 19,18
OPEC, Oil outlook 2002, Reference 20,6 19,7 19,7 19,7
OPEC, Oil outlook 2002, High Price 31,3 31,3 31,3 31,3
OPEC, Oil outlook 2002, Low Price 11,8 11,8 11,8 11,8
Horn, (2002) EIA-oil production, Reference case 27,7 28,5 29,3 30,1
Horn, (2002) Gompertz-oil production, Reference case 39,9 41,1 42,2 43,3
The wide range of price estimations indicates the uncertainty about this issue. Massarrat
extends this even further; he argues that the real scarcity price should range between US$ 30
and 70.76 These numbers are based on the oil price jumps in 1974 and 1979 in real terms.77
5.1.3 Determination of oil prices
A huge pool of factors influences the oil price creating a high complex system. Different
theories attempt to describe and explain this complexity, but at the present moment there is no
approach that can accurately determinate the development of the oil price. Ströbele (1996)
suggests that the development of oil markets from the 1950’s to 1973 and the rapid increase in
the oil price in 1973/1974 can be described by the Hotelling-rule; and the development after
1974 is better described by game theory approaches.
The forecasts on future oil prices show a diverse picture: According to the different
estimations, the price for one barrel of crude oil could be in the range of US$ 19.07 and 43.3
in 2020. This is roughly in the range of OPEC’s target zone model of US$ 22 to 28. However,
none of the aforementioned approaches considers the aspect of a scarcity shock and the
corresponding reactions on markets.
5.2 Oil price volatility
Volatility summarizes price changes over time in a single number, whereby the individual
definition of volatility mainly depends on the user’s time span.78 “Volatility generates
uncertainty and uncertainty inhibits or confuses the investor.”79 Volatile input prices make it
difficult to plan accurately future investments, for both companies and investors. The oil
market is characterized be a high level of volatility. According to an empirical study by
Sadorsky (1999), that scrutinizes oil price volatility and economic impacts, volatility shocks
have asymmetric effects on the activity of the economy.
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 The prices are not adjusted to inflation.
76
 See Massarrat 2000, p. 6
77
 See Massarrat 2000, p. 4
78
 Speculators or day traders care about price movements within minutes, whereas investment funds or policy
makers are more concerned about volatility in a long-term perspective.
79
 See Mabro 2001
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5.2.1 Statistical analysis of oil price volatility
Under closer examination, the volatility of oil price shows the specific statistical feature of
volatility clustering. The volatility clustering implies current volatility shocks influence
expectation of future volatility.80 Two main statistical features of the oil price result in a time-
invariant structure:81 heteroscedasticity82 and autocorrelation.83 Thus, the calculation of the
simple standard deviation (as the square root of variance)84 does not provide accurate results
Engle (1982) introduced the autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) model. In
this model the conditional variance is to be a determinant of the mean and the weightings are
estimated from historical data.85 The model has been extended by Bollerslev (1986) to the
generalized ARCH (GARCH) models, which implies that volatility persistence is infinite and
past volatility is significant in predicting future volatility.
5.2.2 Oil price volatility in the past
Between 1860 and 1900 oil prices were very volatile due to the small size of the industry and
related uncertainties.86 With the foundation of the Seven Sisters87 in 1928 the oil price became
more stable. After 1973 OPEC stabilized the price (except for the oil price shocks in
1973/1974 and 1978/1979). After 1981 the price freely fluctuated at the market. During the
early 1990s huge increases and decreases could be observed due to the first Gulf war. In
general, oil prices have become more volatile since 1986.88
Figure 5.2 Crude oil price volatility
Source: Lynch (2002)
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 See Kuper 2002
81
 See Granger/Machina 2002
82
 Heteroscedasticity indicates increasing variance across residuals. It violates the classical assumption that
error terms have constant variance (homoscedasticity). The presence of heteroscedasticity can be tested with
the Lagrange Multiplier test and the Cook-Weisberg Test.
83
 Autocorrelation is specific condition describing the perseverance of oil price volatility. It refers to the
correlation of two different values of the same variable at two different points in time. To test autocorrelation
in variance the Ljung-Box test and the Durbin Watson Test are mainly applied.
84
 See Fahrmeier et al. 1999, pp. 246-250
85
 See Dockner/Harold 1997, p.6
86
 See Lynch 2002, p. 5
87
 The Seven Sisters was a cartel of seven oil companies consisting of EXXON, MOBIL, SOCAL, Texaco,
Shell, BP, and Gulf.
88
 Compare Lynch 2002 and Stevens 1996
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The main reasons for oil price volatility are information uncertainty about markets and
unexpected events from endogenous and exogenous drivers. According to Lynch (2002)
endogenous reasons for increasing volatility can be divided in: (1) a decline in the surplus
capacity of the petroleum industry, (2) product regulations and price microbursts, and (3)
behavioral changes in demanded inventories and industries’ inventory levels. Exogenous
reasons for increasing volatility can be:89 (1) Data uncertainty and unpredictability: there is
uncertainty about short-term forecast in variables affecting the oil price such as consumption
or economic growth. Further the oil price is affected by a number of unpredictable variables
(weather, wars). Both uncertainty and unpredictability create a false perception about future
market development; and corrections of these errors cause price swings. (2) Speculations:
speculators try to profit from the volatile prices by exploiting arbitrage opportunities and
hence distorting the market. (3) Transparency: although there is an increase in information
flow of data; data on oil consumption or production are hard to obtain and unreliable.
5.2.3 Correlation of oil price volatility and natural scarcity
The VaR model describes future related risks by incorporating implied volatilities, i.e.
historical incidents and developments of the same underlying are utilized for the predicting
future trends. Thus, the objective is to identify natural scarcity indicators that explain an
adequate past oil price volatility. Table 5.2 illustrates several correlation tests that have been
done.
Table 5.2 Tested variables
Production/Demand EIA A “Scarcity coefficient” Ratio between oil production and
demand on EIA figures.
Yearly Volume Future The yearly trading volume of crude oil future contracts based
on NYMEX figures
Log Change Futures Volume The Log change in yearly Futures trading volume based on
NYMEX figures
Yearly Volume Options The yearly trading volume of crude oil option contracts based
on NYMEX figures.
Standard linear regression analyses90 have been used to test these variables on their correlation
with the average yearly oil price volatility. Table 5.3 gives an overview of the results.
Table 5.3 Summary statistics for different oil volatility indicators
 R2 Std. Err.
Pearson
Corr. Significance*
Auto-
correlation
Hetero-
scedasticity
Durbin Watson-
Test**
Cook-Weisberg-
Test χ2  ***
Production/Demand EIA 0,011 0,325 0,103 0,739 0,919 3,575
Yearly Volume Future 0,133 7,54E-10 0,365 0,22 1,126 0
Log Change Futures Vol. 0,03 0,1229 0,173 0,572 1,077 0,15
Yearly Volume Options 0,022 3,31E-09 0,149 0,6 1,07 0,1
*
 Significant at 0,005 or less
**
 No autocorrelation if 1 > x < 3
***
 At n=1, x < 3,5415
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 See Lynch 2002
90
 Compare Griffiths et al. 1993 for detailed information on regression analysis.
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The results point out that past oil price volatility cannot be explained by the chosen scarcity
variables. The poor significance results of the oil price future and option contract volumes are
also confirmed by the results of Fleming and Ostdiek (1999) who found no clear evidence that
an increase in derivative trading results in higher oil price volatility. Thus, the further
challenge is to generate an adequate but significant implied volatility that describes the future
oil price volatility by historical scarcity indicators.
5.3 Conclusion – pricing of scarcity and implied volatility
So far, oil markets have priced man made scarcity; significant price movements have been
determined by artificial scarcity due to political conflicts, economic interventions, or supply
restrictions. The market has not acknowledged natural scarcity yet; prices do not reflect this
risk factor.91 Even so new information about exhaustion has been published; actors in markets
still react in the same manner as usual. However, the seriousness of oil scarcity exists and is
scientifically proven. The actual market development obviously draws an incorrect picture
due to ongoing path-dependencies. According to Reynolds’ model this type of market failure
and information inefficiency can result in a sudden price increase, unpredicted shortages, and
high market uncertainty. The economic and financial risks resulting from such an abrupt
allocation problem are enormous, for both single companies as well as the world economy.
Therefore, existing management systems and risk assessments need to be extended, especially
in order to reflect risks in a long-term horizon. But it is not able to identify ex post significant
relations between increasing natural scarcity and market behavior, neither in terms of oil
prices nor volatility. A lack of empirical data exists for simulating possible future scenarios.
Therefore, the further focus is on generating implied volatilities that consider single events in
the past, where manmade scarcity has emerged. The scenarios in the next chapter assume
future oil markets to react on increasing natural scarcity in a similar way as they did on
artificial scarcity in the past.
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 See Massarat 2000, p. 2
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6 Scenarios
A broad spectrum of different socio-economic, political as well as ecological factors has an
impact on the supply, the demand, and the derived price and volatility of oil. Precise forecasts
seem to be almost impossible due to the resulting complexity. Scenarios can produce a
number of possible futures within a given horizon, by focusing on distinct factors and
generating a spectrum of plausible outcomes. The scenarios in this chapter illustrate potential
developments of the VaR of one barrel crude oil due to natural scarcity.
6.1 Modeling the Scenarios
The scenarios are applied under the assumption of markets acknowledging the depletion mid-
point in 2005. Therefore it is presumed, that once it is statistically and scientifically proven
that the depletion mid-point is reached, markets will realize this and participants will adjust
their decision making processes similar to past incidents when scarcities occurred.
Estimations on other possible depletion mid-points do not reveal any considerable new
insights, as based on the assumptions of the model only the pertaining four price forecasts
would vary negligibly. In the end the calculation results do not differ significantly, only the
date of occurrence is postponed.
Two basic scenarios are designed on empirical data in order to reflect the period after the
occurrence of the depletion mid-point. The scarcity scenarios are based on two 21-month
periods on the oil market taken from historical market developments. These periods are
characterized by a sudden shortage in oil due to political events, increasing uncertainty, and
panic reactions. The developments of the oil price and its volatility during these periods are
applied to reflect market reactions for a possible mid depletion situation. By taking a 21-
month period not only the short-term reactions of the market but also the following
“normalization” process of the price can be observed. In the scenarios, the depletion mid-
point occurs at a fixed point in time, without any distinct preceding warning. This assumption
corresponds to Reynolds (1999) who states that a severe increase in prices is possible even
after decades of falling prices. Furthermore, according to scenarios presented at the
Copenhagen Conference on “Oil Demand, Production and Cost – Prospects for the Future” in
2003, a sudden steep drop in oil supply combined with a growing demand is considered to be
a realistic option for future developments.92 
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Table 6.1 Construction of the basic scenarios
Scenario Characteristic features Possible explanation within the 21-month period
S1 • High uncertainty
• Overreactions in
the short term
• After a couples of
month moderate
increases of prices
• Panic sells and purchases
• Path-dependence remains to a certain extent
• Unreliable information about oil endowment and
actual production quantities
S2 • Lower uncertainty
• Constant increase
of market prices
within the time
period
• Market participants realize and accept slowly
fostering scarcity
• Demand increases steady, reinforced due to
development in emerging markets
• Oil supply is reliable, no unexpected alterations of
delivery
With the follow up scenarios the basic versions are extended to three additional price
developments. Per definition these additional developments include the following 39 months,
in the end this results in a five-year scenario. To extend the scenarios beyond this time frame
does not seem to provide realistic and useful results. Furthermore, the purpose is to describe
potential market reactions in a rather short term, after natural scarcity is acknowledged.
These extended scenarios are based neither on historical data nor on official estimations. It is
assumed that after markets accept the existence of the depletion mid-point they will act and
counteract as described in the basic scenarios S1 and S2. In this relatively short time range,
actors on markets have different short-term options and strategies for matching demand and
supply. After this period the latitude of markets decreases and more exogenous long-term
factors have to be taken into consideration for determining prices. Hence, the follow-up
scenarios are trends representing certain constant price developments. The implied volatility
is assumed to be constant for the 39 months of the follow up scenarios.
A backstop price has to be defined, where alternative technologies, substitute fuels, or new
exploration areas and methods become economically viable. Per definition the maximum
price shall not exceed 70 US/$barrel. This corresponds to the oil price leap in real terms, after
OPEC cut the oil supply in 1979.93 The extended scenarios define a linear, regressive and an
exponential course of prices towards the backstop price, whereby:
a) The linear trend assumes the same monthly price-increase remains as calculated in the
basic scenarios.
b) The regressive trend assumes a diminishing monthly price increase. After the first 21
month the scarcity shock is received as being less and less relevant. Markets slide into
a new kind of path-dependency: a high price level remains and the price increases in a
diminishing trend.
c) The exponential trend assumes that the effects of scarcity accelerate over time. The
market price increases exponentially.
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 See Massarat 2000, p. 4
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Table 6.2 Construction of the extended scenarios
Scenario Characteristic features Possible explanation within the 5-year time frame
S1-a • High uncertainty
• High price level
• Linear increase of
prices in a
moderate way
• Ad-hoc information on markets
• Alternatives and substitutes are available, but
sufficient implementation takes time; newly explored
are not able to meet increasing demand
• Long term market trend is constant
• Demand cannot be met
S1-b • High uncertainty
• High price level
• In the long run
regressive increase
of prices in a
negligible manner
• Participants are still unsettled but opinions and
strategies due to market trend match in many areas in
the long term
• Options for alternatives and substitutes are used more
and more; newly explored fields are able to damp the
price increase due to it’s high level
• Strong evidence for path-dependency, until a new
shock reaction occurs
• Gap between demand and supply increases slowly
and in a downward trend
S1-c • High uncertainty
• High price level
• In the long run
exponential
increase of prices
in a significant
way
• Unreliable information and short-term speculation on
markets
• Alternatives and substitutes are not marketable in
sufficient manner; new areas turn out not to be
economically viable
• Increasing supply shortages causing steady and steep
price increases up to the backstop-level
• Gap between demand and supply increases
dramatically
S2-a • Lower uncertainty
and price level
• Linear increases of
prices with a high
rate of  price
increase
• Stocks and markets are relatively transparent and
reliable; common opinion and strategy due to long
term market trend
• Alternatives and substitutes are not sufficiently
implemented at the beginning; newly explored fields
can only marginally dampen the price increase
• Long term market trend is constant
• Gap between demand and supply increases steadily
S2-b • Lower uncertainty
and price level
• In the long run
regressive increase
of prices in a
rather negligible
manner
• Stocks and markets are transparent and reliable;
opinions and strategies due to market trend match
• Options for alternatives, substitutes, and new
explorations are available; they are used more and
more with increasing market pressure
• Path-dependency resumes, although prices rise
slightly; the scarcity shock is considered as
temporary
• Supply seems to meet demand
S2-c • Lower uncertainty
and price level
• In the long run
exponential
increase of prices
with a accelerated
rate of  price
increase
• Stocks and markets seem to be transparent to a
certain extent; reliable information about ultimate oil
endowment
• Increasing supply shortages causing significant price
increases
• Alternatives and substitutes are not marketable at all,
even under increasing market pressure; no
fundamental new explorations
• Gap between demand and supply increases
constantly
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the methodology. Within the 21-month period the two basis scenarios S1
and S2 are applied, based on empirical data. The there follow up scenarios for the ensuing 39
month are based on the three assumed trends a, b, and c.
Figure 6.1 Modeling the basic and extended scenarios
6.2 Determining the basic scenarios’ variables
Based on the World Oil Market and Oil Price Chronologies: 1971 – 2002 published by the
Energy Information Administration (2003) historical oil price movements have been scanned
for incidents, where scarcity occurred for different reasons, such as oil productions cut backs
or political crisis. Two 21-month periods are chosen to reflect potential oil price movements
in the scenarios.
Period 1: January 1990 – September 1991 – historical base for scenario S1; Features:
• Iraq’s invasion in Kuwait causes rise in oil prices
• U.S. refinery problems indicate a loss in daily capacity
• January – February 1991: very volatile oil prices due to inconsistent news about the
Gulf war
• OPEC production cuts by 22.3 million barrel/day
• Announcement of Soviet Union oil export cuts by nearly half
• High level of monthly volatility
Period 2: January 1999 – September 2000 – historical base for scenario S2; Features:
• Several OPEC and Non-OPEC production cuts
• High world oil demand
• Low crude oil stock levels in the United States
• Trend of a high rate of monthly price increases
Scenarios 33
The underlying prices for the scenarios are taken from two estimations by the Energy
Information Agency (2002). These scenarios are chosen due to the similarity of the results of
the OPEC oil outlook (2002).
Table 6.3 Price scenarios EIA
Author 2005
EIA (Energy Information Agency), 2003  High Price 28,65
EIA (Energy Information Agency), 2003  Low Price 22,04
As the EIA-estimations assume that the OPEC is not completely exhausting it’s scope of
prices,94 Horn’s scenarios are based on the assumption of profit maximization by OPEC.
Horn’s reference case scenario represents an optimistic view of world’s oil endowment, while
the second scenario estimates world’s ultimate recovery with the Gompertz-curve.95
Table 6.4 Price scenarios Horn
Author 2005
Horn, (2002) EIA-oil production, Reference case 27,7
Horn, (2002) Gompertz-oil production 39,9
The average volatility observed in the historical periods is adopted to generate implied
volatilities. The log returns Rt of prices of the last trading day of the month
Rt = LOG(Pt /Pt-1) Equation 6.1
are taken to calculate the average volatility on a monthly basis. Under the assumption of
normal distribution of the log-normal returns and a constant variance,96 the volatility is
described by the standard deviation.97 As the tests in Table 6.5 indicate, there are no signs of
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the standard deviation of the so defined volatility.
Table 6.5 Summary statistics for monthly oil price returns
Heteroscedasticity
Cook Weisberg χ2*
Autocorrelation
Durbin-Watson-Test**
Log return 0,65 2,023
*
 No heteroscedasticity at n=1 if χ2 < 3,5415
**
 No autocorrelation if 1 > x < 3
Other studies use daily returns of oil prices as basis for their volatility calculation and apply
different models, such as (G)ARCH98 or historical simulation with ARMA.99 In this paper
implied volatilities are utilized to generate scenarios in a distant future. Thus, the average
yearly volatilities and log-normal changes in the oil price have been calculated on a monthly
basis.
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 See Horn 2002, p. 108
95
 In differentiation to the symmetric Hubbert-curve, the Gompertz-curve has an asymmetric shape.
96
 Var(Rt) = σ2 = E(Rt-µ)2, where µ is the mean.
97
 Var(Rt)0,5
98
 See Bollerslev 1986
99
 See Engle 1982
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Figure 6.2 Oil price development in period one
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Figure 6.3 Oil price development in period two
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Both periods are utilized to describe the variables of the two basic scenarios S1 and S2. Over
the 21-months time frame, period one features a higher level of volatility, but lower rate of
monthly price increases. In comparison the average monthly volatility of period two is lower,
but the oil price increases with higher pace.
Table 6.6 Average volatility and price changes for 21-month period
Scenario Average monthly volatility Average monthly price increase
S1 18,02 % 0,037 %
S2 6,88 % 2,05 %
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6.3 Determining the extended scenarios’ variables
The two basic scenarios reflect the market’s reaction in a temporary scarcity situation, where
supply shocks are dampened to a certain extent by so called “buffers”;100 national oil stocks of
the industrialized countries are able to ease the effects of natural supply cuts. In the case of
natural scarcity, these stocks are likely to dampen the supply shock for only a short time. For
the scenarios it is assumed that this is the case within the first 21 month; afterwards, national
oil stocks are not able to influence the market any longer. The supply is solely determined by
other factors; the resulting market developments are described by the extended scenarios. The
curves of the extended sub-scenarios are derived from the basic scenarios and combined with
three different options for further development.
The price in sub-scenario “a” increases linearly. After the first 21 months the trend has been
calculated applying a linear trend formula p = ca-1 + (ca-2 * t), where p is the price in US$, ca-1
and ca-2 are coefficients and t reflects the time. The coefficients are derived from characteristic
features and trends of the basic scenarios.
Sub-scenario “b” applies a regressive trend based on a logarithmic trend formula
p =  cb-1 + (cb-2 * LN t). Figure 6.4 illustrates the log-normal oil price changes from on a
month-to-month level for scenario S1-b.
Figure 6.4 Monthly rate of log-normal price change for the regressive price trend
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The price development in sub-scenario “c“ is exponential. The underlying formula is
p = cc-1  * e (cc-2 *t).
In the case of a price development in the extended scenario hits the backstop price of 70
US$/barrel, it is assumed that the price does not increase further and stops at this level for the
rest of the considered time frame. As the implied volatility is hold constant in the extended
scenarios, the VaR is then also constant.
                                                 
100 See Stiglitz 1992
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6.4 Results
The statistical results of the two 21-month periods were applied to the four price estimations
and an assumed depletion mid-point in 2005. As an example, figure 6.5 illustrates the two
possible scenarios on the basis of the EIA high price estimation.
Figure 6.5 Depletion mid-point scenario 2005, prices in US$/barrel, first 21 months
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In scenario S2 (blue graph) the market reacts immediately after there is a common agreement
regarding the occurrence of the depletion mid-point. Within the first 21 months the price
reaches a level of US$/barrel 40.64. In scenario S1 (green graph) the information needs certain
time to hit the market. After the first seven months the oil price is skyrocketing and reflects an
over-reaction of the market. At a peak of US$/barrel 37.56 the price normalizes, but
uncertainty remains, hence a high level of volatility.
Table 6.7 and 6.8 summarize the VaR simulation results for the 21-month period. The third
column describes the VaR for the first month when markets have acknowledged the depletion
mid-point. The ensuing two columns illustrated the minimum and the maximum VaR within
the underlying 21-month period.
Table 6.7 Results of VaR – basic scenarios – in US$/barrel – EIA estimations
Scenario EIA-
estimation
VaR first
month
Min. VaR
within 21
months
Max. VaR
within 21
months
S1 Low 6,55 5,76 8,60
high 8,51 7,49 11,16
S2 Low 2,50 2,42 3,91
high 3,25 3,15 5,08
Table 6.8 Results of VaR – basic scenarios – in US$/barrel – Horn estimations
Scenario Horn-
estimation
VaR first
month
Min. VaR
within 21
months
Max. VaR
within 21
months
S1 reference 8,23 7,23 10,79
gompertz 11,86 10,43 15,55
S2 reference 3,14 3,05 4,91
gompertz 4,53 4,39 7,07
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Example: Under the assumption that the depletion mid-point is reached in 2005, the possible
VaR of one barrel crude oil can range between US$ 2.5 and 11.86 once markets face the
scarcity shock. If markets recover and path-dependency resumes, the VaR can afterwards
drop back to a minimum level of US$ 2.42 within the next 21 month. On the other hand the
VaR can increase to a maximum level of US$ 11.16 applying the EIA estimations and even
US$ 15.55 applying the Horn estimations.
The conclusions out of the simulations are, (1) the VaR is likely to increase steadily over
time, once the depletion mid-point is acknowledged by the markets, (2) this is independent of
the underlying price forecasts and market behavior, (3) the significant higher differences
between the minimum and maximum VaR for all price assumptions in period two can be
explained by the higher monthly growth rate of the oil price, (4) the relatively higher VaR for
all scenarios of period one is linked to the underlying higher implied volatility.
Table 6.9 and 6.10 summarize the VaR simulation results of the extended scenarios. In the
columns the VaR of different time segments are calculated. A differentiated consideration of
the minimum and maximum VaR is not appropriate for this diagram as constant developments
are assumed over this time frame.
Table 6.9 Results of VaR – 5-year horizon – in US$/barrel – EIA estimations
Scenario EIA-estimation VaR after 30
months
VaR after 40
months
VaR after 50
months
VaR after 60
months
S1-a low 7,88 8,52 9,04 9,67
high 9,15 9,75 10,26 10,77
S1-b low 6,65 6,71 6,75 6,79
high 8,64 8,72 8,77 8,83
S1-c low 8,45 9,7 11,14 12,79
high 9,63 10,6 11,76 13,24
S2-a low 4,38 4,98 5,57 6,16
high 5,25 5,90 6,56 7,21
S2-b low 3,84 3,97 4,07 4,15
high 5,22 5,40 5,54 5,62
S2-c low 4,62 5,58 6,73 7,95
high 5,41 6,35 7,45 7,95
Table 6.10 Results of VaR – 5-year horizon – in US$/barrel – Horn estimations
Scenario Horn-estimation VaR after 30
months
Var after 40
months
VaR after 50
months
VaR after 60
months
S1-a reference 8,94 9,43 9,92 10,41
gompertz 12,40 12,94 13,48 14,03
S1-b reference 8,35 8,43 8,49 8,53
gompertz 12,04 12,14 12,23 12,29
S1-c reference 9,26 10,14 11,10 12,14
gompertz 13,20 14,43 15,78 17,24
S2-a reference 5,18 5,82 6,47 7,12
gompertz 7,40 7,95 7,95 7,95
S2-b reference 4,86 4,99 5,12 5,22
gompertz 6,94 7,18 7,37 7,52
S2-c reference 5,3 6,19 7,23 7,95
gompertz 7,62 7,95 7,95 7,95
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Example: The most conservative scenario results in a VaR of US$ 4.15, five years after
markets have acknowledged the depletion mid-point. This value is based on the EIA low price
estimations, the rather non-volatile market behavior, and an assumed return to path-
dependency in the follow up scenario. On the other hand, the highest VaR result applying the
exponential price developments in the follow up scenarios and the higher volatility of S1.
After five years, for the EIA high price estimation the VaR is then as high as US$ 13.24;
applying the Horn-Gompertz forecast the possible VaR reaches even US$ 17.24.
The conclusions out of these extended simulations are, (1) based on the characteristic features
and derived trends of the two scenarios S1 and S2 the VaR is likely to increase further for all
underlying price forecasts within the considered five-year time frame, (2) for the development
of the VaR over the time it is not important which initial price estimation the scenario is based
on, (3) significant differences of VaR result mainly from the underlying price development
and the implied volatility.
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7 Summary and final conclusions
“Financial analysts and investors are recognizing that there is a strong, positive, and growing
correlation between industrial companies’ ‘sustainability’ performance and their competitive-
ness and financial performance.”101 But for integrating sustainability factors into the measure-
ment of return on investment or return on equity, quantitative data is needed. The Value-at-
Risk approach is able to provide concise information in this matter. This paper illustrates how
the VaR method can be applied in the context of carbon risks.
An examination of literature on the assessment of carbon risks reveals that the output
dimension – climate change – is one of the biggest issues the world faces in the 21st century.
Finally, this seems to have attracted the attention of the business community; but financial
markets still do not price corresponding risks. Furthermore, confirmations pertaining to risks
in the input dimension are lacking despite the importance of carbon resources in today’s
economy. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to broaden the discussion on corporate
environmental risk exposure by integrating an oil scarcity factor. This broader approach can
be utilized as a means of instigating a discussion on carbon risks beyond output oriented
adaptation and mitigation strategies. Even though the outcomes might not seem to be relevant
for current economic activities, the recent discussion about oil prices affecting the global
economy illustrates the future relevance of this topic;102 it is just a matter of time before risks
related to future oil supply and endowment will emerge.
The scenarios show the potential risk exposure of crude oil; i.e. the VaR results give insight
on the extension and quantity of the risk once markets have started to realize actuality of this
new type of risk dimension. The VaR model illustrates how volatile input prices bare
immense risks by increasing uncertainty. Thus, the scarcity risk is not defined and scrutinized
as a single risk of increasing prices but also as a risk of uncertainty and volatile markets.
Empirical data are taken from two historical periods, when artificial scarcity occurred. The
periods are harnessed to generate two different implied volatilities. In two basic scenarios the
implied volatilities are used to anticipate possible future market behavior, when markets will
acknowledge and therefore price natural scarcity. On the basis of four different price
estimations two basic scenarios are generated for 21 months. The follow up scenarios describe
a five-year time frame. They are based on the characteristic features of the two basic scenarios
and assume three different market developments. The overall results present a spectrum of
potential VaR that can be summed up as:
• The basic scenarios illustrate that the VaR might be as high as US$ 2.4 up to 15.5
within the first 21 months.
• The follow up scenarios result in a VaR between US$ 4.1 and 17.2 for the end of the
five-year time frame.
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• The scenarios are based on the assumption that the depletion mid-point will occur in
2005; presuming depletion mid-points at a later point in time do not alter the results in
a significant way, only the date of occurrence is postponed.
• The results show that the VaR is likely to increase steadily over the time, once the
depletion mid-point is reached and acknowledged by the markets. This is independent
of the underlying price forecasts and market behavior.
• The different price estimations of the scenarios are not the crucial factor for the VaR
development in the course of time. Significant differences in the development of the
VaR result mainly from the actual price development and its volatility.
The final conclusion is, that once the depletion mid-point has been acknowledged by markets,
natural oil scarcity will result in a higher VaR. This is the result of all scenarios, irregardless
whether the underlying estimations are conservative or not. The outcomes illustrate possible
developments under the assumption that markets will react similar to the two underlying
historical periods. The definite course of the VaR cannot be predicted. But it can be stated that
once markets have realized oil scarcity and react in a similar way, the market behavior will
determine the level of VaR: As the actual prices will increase, the higher the VaR is going to
be; volatile oil prices as a result of uncertainty will foster this.
7.1 Discussion of the results
The spectrum of oil depletion forecasts is huge and the results differ immensely; however, it
is certain that sooner or later the world’s oil-resources are going to be exhausted.103 From an
economic point of view, it is crucial to focus on the peak production rather than on the overall
depletion. However, defining exactly when this peak is reached and forecasting market
behavior are two different things. Even so statistics might be able to prove that oil reserves are
situated at the downward part of the curve, specific industries, governments, or other
influential actors will affirm their opinion and insist that there is no oil scarcity. This might
influence the attitude and behavior of market’s participants in a way that none of the forecasts
turn out to be real for a next two decades and strong path-dependency remains. Furthermore,
the amount of stored oil and the effects of buffers can steer the entire development in a totally
different way, as they play a crucial role in the determination of market behavior. On the other
hand, the current development in emerging markets points out that the world oil demand is
going to increase significantly; therefore, future effects of path-dependency or buffers have to
be questioned in general.
Nevertheless, focusing on the economic implications and impacts of oil scarcity, the imminent
effects after the peak have to be considered. Possible outcomes are described by the basic
scenarios (21-month period) and the extended scenarios (five years). Three main factors
emerge: the price, its volatility, and the actual availability. In this paper the price and the
volatility are considered in terms of market’s reactions due to restrictions by nature. Change
of technology, the option of alternative fuels and other substitutes are not considered in an
explicit way; three different developments are assumed whereby single triggers are not
discussed in detail. Other possible restrictions like taxes or political interventions and their
effects are not contemplated.
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According to Cabedo and Moya (2003) a volatile oil price environment requires an adequate
risk assessment and quantification. The results of the scenarios illustrate that under the
assumption of increasing scarcity the VaR of oil increases significantly. This entails rising
uncertainty on markets and increasing potential financial losses related to investments in oil
sensitive sectors. In this context it has to be questioned whether the VaR approach provides
adequate assessments and concise quantifications. Although there is a relatively high
significance of the developed scarcity variables, the weaknesses of the approach need to be
considered: as discussed in chapter four drawbacks emerge due to the assumption of fixed
patterns on markets, the existence of fat tails, and the reliance on ex post data. Furthermore,
forecasts of future oil prices and its’ volatility depend on a wide range of variables and factors
that have not been considered explicitly. Admittedly, all these factors make an accurate and
precise forecast almost impossible. Thus, the scenarios describe a spectrum of potential
outcomes. However, the actual VaR is likely to be within this forecast frame. The uncertainty
of the estimations in this paper are correlated to the uncertainty level in the quoted predictions
on world’s ultimate resources of oil and the future oil price. The implied volatilities are based
on historical reactions on markets and assume a similar behavior in future. For utilizing the
results in concrete assessments the user has to choose and define the preferred variables first.
To sum up, the outcomes of this survey present a new view on evaluating risks related to
scarcity of oil. Especially in the light of the discussed uncertainty and reliability of underlying
data, the purpose of this paper was not to give a concise prediction. The scenarios and
estimated figures rather intend to illustrate a possible frame for the actual development and to
initiate and stimulate further discussions and research on this topic.
7.2 Integrating the results in corporate and financial risk management
Companies and sectors have different exposure to carbon risk. Similar to the company’s
general risk profile, the risk profile in the context of increasing oil scarcity is determined by:
• The company’s asset mix,
• The necessity on oil as an input factor,
• The possibility for substitution and technical alternatives,
• It’s position in the value chain, and
• The location of its operational activities and sales.
In accordance to the quoted studies, the output dimension of carbon risks illustrates that
specific sectors are more concerned than other sectors. In the input dimension the most
vulnerable sectors are; the entire oil industry, the automobile industry, transport and energy
industries. The risk exposure becomes obvious as oil currently provides 40% of all energy and
nearly 90% of all transportation fuel.104 But beyond that every industry has to consider this
issue when crude oil is used as an input factor within the production process or the supply
chain. And from this point of view not only the internal activities have to be evaluated; also
suppliers and customers can have a higher risk exposure and therefore affect the bottom line.
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In the next step it is discussed how the input oriented VaR approach could be integrated into
the strategic planning of companies and financial performance analysis. Potential ways of
considering oil scarcity as a risk factor could be:
Include the oil VaR in strategic planning at a company level
Company’s management can derive their individual risk exposure to oil scarcity by examining
the percentage of assets and products linked to oil as an input factor and multiplying these
assets with a VaR figure. A substitution factor can be added showing which assets can be easy
substituted or technical altered and which have to rely on oil. The results help to evaluate
different strategies and options.
For example, a company works in the chemical industry and uses oil as an input factor, both
within a specific production process and for the energy production. Assuming the case that a
sudden and permanent shortage in oil occurs, the company has to adapt current strategies; two
options are possible: (1) A specific production system could be replaced by a new one with
less oil consumption. This alternative is combined with high investment costs. Furthermore,
the process is still relying on oil. Assets like this are very inflexible concerning the
substitution of oil. (2) On the other hand, single assets for energy production can be
considered to be more flexible in terms of adaptation strategies: An oil based combustor can
be replaced by a new one using an alternative energy source; or at least the option of
outsourcing exists.
Incorporation of the oil VaR in the evaluation of stocks
Volatile input prices affect companies’ cost structure; in the end this can be interpreted as a
factor for determining shareholder value. There have already been attempts to add an oil price
factor to the CAPM-framework.105 By including the discussed VaR considerations into the
fundamental analysis of stocks, related risks can be analyzed and assessed more accurately.
Include the oil VaR calculations in credit ratings of companies
Rating agencies and banks analyze companies’ cost structure, (risk-)management activities,
and competitiveness on current and future markets. Especially long-term risks are relevant for
calculating risk premiums. Thus, oil scarcity should be a crucial factor as it determines future
options and constrains on markets. In the context of company ratings Standard & Poor has
already pointed out the potential negative effects in the output dimension. Therefore it seems
to be just a matter of time, when the analysis will be enlarged by a scarcity factor.
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Include the oil VaR considerations in credit ratings of countries and bonds
For private and institutional investors holding large bond positions in their long-term
investment portfolio it is interesting to obtain detailed information about a countries predicted
GDP development and composition. New risks and options can be revealed in this matter by
analyzing the dependency of GDP on oil (e.g. by analyzing a country’s income related to oil
imports or exports).
Development of a sustainable benchmark system
In a further step the VaR of oil could be compared with the VaR of potential alternatives. This
benchmark system could facilitate strategic decision making related to future investment
opportunities. Areas where oil can be substituted by alternative input factors, the VaR of all
alternatives could provide another indicator for the economic feasibility of future investments.
7.3 Suggestions for further research
In general further research is advised to put emphasis on more concrete calculation of VaR of
resource inputs and volatility forecast. With the focus on oil scarcity, the development of
further highly significant variables for oil can increase the describing and forecasting value of
this VaR model.
Future studies could develop an integrated evaluation model including the VaR of oil as an
input factor and VaR of climate change. Garz and Volk (2003) calculated the worldwide
market VaR of climate change at the macro-level. It is a challenging task to answer the
question of how these results can be transferred to the micro-level. Given precise outcomes
result, the combination with input oriented VaR figures could generate an overall carbon risk
assessment.
Beyond the limitations of this model, a certain level of consensus about this topic will settle
sooner or later as a matter of fact. Then management models and analysis instruments are
needed to incorporate derived threats and risk. Thus, adequate tools such as the suggested
benchmark system should be developed by then. It has to be scrutinized to what extent single
companies and sectors are affected by oil scarcity; empirical simulations and correlation
studies are needed to reveal the actual coherence between carbon risks and companies’
success.
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